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We analyse the e®ect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability
of sudden stops of capital °ows from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Our model
predicts that the probability of crises increases with the uncertainty, ie. the dispersion
of private signals about the true value of the fundamentals. Using two datasets of
Consensus and WES forecasts for 31 developed and developing countries for the time
period from January 1990 until December 2001 we verify the theoretical prediction.
We apply probit estimation controlling for time and country e®ects. Additionally, we
show that the result is robust for numerous speci¯cations.
JEL classi¯cation: C 72, D 82, D 84, F 21, F 32, F 34, F 41
Keywords: Capital Flows, Government debt, Sudden Stops,
Global Games, Coordination Failure
01 Introduction
Most major ¯nancial crises involve the sudden stop of capital in°ows.1 Examples are the
Latin American debt crises during the 1980s, the crisis experienced in south-east Asia in 1997
and Russia 1998. In the literature a sudden stop is de¯ned as a sharp reversal in capital
°ows associated with severe economic consequences.
One of the most prominent ¯nancial crises, which even spread to other emerging countries
around the world, was the Tequila crisis, that hit Mexico at the end of 1994 and beginning
of 1995. Mexico experienced a reduction of net private capital °ows of almost 4 percent of
the GDP in 1994 and a drop of more than 5 percent in 1995. 2 The country went through
a currency crises followed by a severe drop in output of 6 percent in the crisis year. During
this time the country also plunged into a systemic banking crisis until 1997, including a
temporary insolvency of 19 percent of the ¯nancial system assets.
This example illustrates the need to understand the causes of such a crisis and to ¯nd
instruments in the e®ort to prevent them. This paper contributes to this agenda, ¯rst by
explaining in the set up of a coordination game how the uncertainty about the fundamen-
tals of an economy by private investors increases the probability of a sudden stop of capital
°ows. Second, we validate the predictions of the theoretical model empirically. Uncertainty
describes the dispersion of private signals around the true value of the fundamentals. It can
be seen as the disagreement between the private investors about the quality of the funda-
mentals. A sudden stop is de¯ned as a sharp negative variation in capital °ows associated
with severe economic consequences.
The current theoretical and empirical literature on the occurrence of sudden stops ignores
the e®ect of uncertainty about the fundamentals. This seems surprising and leaves room for
a contribution - especially with respect to the fact that investors are assumed to take their
investment decisions in a forward looking manner. They are assumed to base their decisions
on expectations about future returns, which in turn depend on other investors' behavior and
the future fundamentals in an economy.3 This issue also has policy implications: If lower
precision of information about the fundamentals of an economy and therefore uncertainty
about these values increases the probability of a sudden stop of capital °ows, then an economy
will be more vulnerable in times when uncertainty is higher, and policymakers should adjust
their policies.
The basic model is an extension of Calvo (2003) where we introduce in¯nitely many
players of mass one. We then set up a coordination game. In this basic model investors
maximize the value of their ¯rm which is the net present value of their after tax returns net
of investments. The government mechanically sets the tax rate that is necessary to cover
1cf. list of headline ¯nancial crises in appendix (A.12). These crises were so severe, that they were in the
newspaper headlines around the world and are remembered by most of us for the turmoil that they involved.
2These percentages correspond to a drop in capital °ows of 15,5 billion current US dollars in 1994 and
further 15,2 billion in 1995 in absolute values.
3In our model sudden stops of capital °ows are assumed to be unexpected to private investors, in this
sense they are still not forward looking. Nevertheless, one can show that the results of our analysis also hold
for an expected sudden stop. cf. Calvo (2003)
1the exogenously given amount of debt. However, the tax lowers the after-tax productivity of
capital which is the crucial variable in the investment decision of the ¯rms in the economy.
For su±ciently low levels of debt, the government sets so low output taxes, that investing
is attractive. In this model the level of investment directly determines the economic growth of
the economy. Hence, a high level of investment induces high growth. On the other extreme,
where the debt is high, only low growth can be observed due to the negative impact of the
required high taxes.
However, for intermediate levels of the government debt the optimal action of a player
depends on the actions of the other players. If a ¯rm expects all other ¯rms to invest, it
is optimal for this company to invest. This is due to the debt burden being shared by a
large number of other ¯rms. Hence the government can choose a low tax rate and the after
tax return of the investing ¯rms is high. Otherwise, if a ¯rm expects that few other ¯rms
will invest, it is optimal for this company to abstain from investing, as it will have to pay
high taxes because the debt burden is shared by few investors. This mechanism explains
a multiplicity of equilibria in the intermediate debt region. High (low) growth induces low
(high) output taxes, which in turn generates high (low) economic growth.
A sudden stop takes place when growth discontinuously switches from high to low growth.
With the help of the methodology of global games(¯rst introduced by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) and then prominently applied to currency crises by Morris and Shin (1998))
we can show that there exists a threshold level of the government debt, below which everyone
invests and above which no one does. Speci¯cally, we assume that the true value of the
government debt is no longer common knowledge, but that every investor receives a private
signal on the level of debt.45 This results in an additional equilibrium condition which
allows us to ¯nd the unique threshold. Investors have to compare the expected value of
their company in the following to cases: when they invest in the case that su±cient other
companies share the tax burden and when they invest with only a few other ¯rms to share
the burden. Above the threshold the economy drops to the low growth equilibrium due to
a lack of investment, although the state of the fundamentals would still support the high
growth equilibrium. The reason for the switch is a coordination failure between private
investors.
We ¯nd a set of interesting comparative static results from analyzing the threshold equi-
librium. In our set up the change in the value of the threshold translates into a change in the
probability of a crisis. First, we ¯nd that the probability of a sudden stops increases with
the dispersion of the private signals on ¯scal burden. Secondly, we ¯nd that the probability
of a crisis also decreases with the parameter of technological progress. This parameter can
also be understood as an indication how safe an investment is. Third we can show that the
probability of sudden stops increases with the international interest rate. And lastly, we ¯nd
that technological progress and international interest rate in°uence the scope of government
4It is a plausible assumption that investors interpret published information about the state of the funda-
mentals di®erently.
5We assume that the government debt and the private signals are uniformly distributed.
2policies.
The policy implications of these ¯ndings are that governments should take the uncertainty
about the fundamentals into account, because it has real e®ects. The advice would be to
help private investors to get precise private information. One way of achieving this would
be the government allowing unrestricted access to the government data, i.e. to independent
agencies which are allowed to sell this data. One could argue that it would not make a
di®erence if the government sold this information. However, a government could have an
incentive to understate the true value of the fundamentals and then ask for higher taxes ex
post. This credibility problem could be alleviated with the help of an independent agency.
Secondly, these results suggest that governments should care for the investment safety in
their country and foster technological progress.
How relevant are the described e®ects in reality? Speci¯cally one would like to verify that
technological progress, the international interest rate and most interestingly the uncertainty
about the fundamentals in°uence the probability of a sudden stop in reality. The ¯rst
hypothesis is that sudden stops are less likely to take place when internal factors of emerging
market countries become more favorable, e.g. if governments adopt technology enhancing
policies or take measures to ensure investment safety. The second hypothesis which follows
from the theory, is that more sudden stops occur if the international interest rate increases.
And a third hypothesis is that sudden stops are more likely to arise with more uncertainty
on the government's ¯scal policy (less precise private information).
It is the last hypothesis that we are focussing on, in the empirical analysis. The empirical
analysis of sudden stops has been subject in the recent literature: Calvo et al. (2004) ana-
lyze drivers of sudden stops and ¯nd that especially the vulnerability to real exchange rate
°uctuations and domestic liability dollarization increase the probability of a crisis. Edwards
(2005) focusses on capital mobility and disputes its link to higher crisis probability. Also the
question whether it is internal or external - rather global - factors that drive capital °ows
into and out of emerging markets has been extensively studied. Calvo et al. (1993),Calvo
et al. (1996), Fernandez-Arias (1996), Montiel and Reinhart (1999) examine internal factors
such as for example the price of debt on the secondary market, country credit ratings, the
domestic rate of in°ation versus external ones such as the interest rates and the economic
activity in highly developed countries. These analyzes attribute a higher importance to the
external factors. In the more recent literature with a focus on FDI Albuquerque et al. (2003)
¯nd that the most important driver of the capital °ows is a synthetic global factor, which
they interpret as a globalization measure. Broner and Rigobon (2004) detect regional pat-
terns in capital °ows and emphasize the role of contagion in determining capital movements
to a country.
However, this literature ignores the e®ect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on
the occurrence of sudden stops. Only in the context of currency crises the issue has been
addressed so far: Prati and Sbracia (2002) conduct a convincing analysis of the e®ect of
uncertainty on currency crises. With their seemingly unrelated time series regressions for six
Asian economies they show, that higher dispersion of GDP growth forecasts (their proxy for
3the fundamentals) tends to have an additional independent e®ect from the e®ect exercised
by the lagged level of the fundamental.
Sudden stops of capital °ows seem a natural application for their approach. A drawback
of the above mentioned analysis is its application to a small sample of countries that were
all a®ected by the East Asian ¯nancial crisis 1997/98. Therefore, it seems appropriate to
use a larger sample of countries, developing and developed. Secondly, as the model that we
are developing is static we make predictions about crisis probabilities and therefore a probit
estimation seems to be the best approach. As a benchmark regression we estimate a pooled
probit with country and time dummies. The data set contains 31 developing and developed
countries where the sample size is dictated by data availability. The analyzed period extends
from 1990 until 2001. We analyze yearly and monthly data.
In line with Calvo et al. (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2006)
we detect sudden stops of capital °ows by considering both the ¯rst and the second moments
of a measure of capital °ows. Provided that in a particular period the capital °ows drop as
low as two standard deviations below the sample mean, a crisis period starts when the °ows
drop lower than one standard deviation below the sample mean. For symmetry it stops when
the °ows exceed this limit again. In our analysis the most important explanatory variable is
a measure of uncertainty about the fundamentals: The variance of speculators' expectations
about the fundamentals. Here we use expectations about GDP growth of the current and
following year. These data are collected by Consensus Economics and the IFO Institute for
Economic Research. We work with the growth forecasts because they are available for a
su±ciently large sample of countries.
The search for determinants of sudden stops very quickly leads to a problem of omitted
variables and endogeneity. To tackle these di±culties we run various robustness checks.
Speci¯cally, to address the ¯rst problem we include a large variety of control variables. In
order to address the endogeneity problem, we estimate the model with an increasing order
of lags of the explanatory variables. Additionally, we employ two step estimation where
we instrument the uncertainty in the current period with its own lag. Furthermore, we
check the robustness of our results by doing the analysis for the full sample and an emerging
market sample, by making use of a yearly and monthly data set and by using various di®erent
estimation methods. The positive e®ect of the uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden stops
of capital °ows is robust across these tests.
Calculating the marginal e®ects of a one unit increase of uncertainty suggests that an
increase of the uncertainty by one standard deviation increases the probability of a crisis by
up to nine percent.6 These results suggest that indeed the uncertainty about the fundamen-
tals has a non negligible e®ect on the probability of sudden stops in reality and should thus
be incorporated in the considerations regarding economic policies.
6cf. table(5) in section (7.2)
42 Theoretical Background
This section presents a coordination game on the occurrence of sudden stops of capital °ows.
Our model is based on the framework presented in Calvo (1998) as well as Calvo (2003).
We depart from the Calvo set up by introducing a continuum of in¯nitely existing, identical
companies of mass one. Thereby we can set up a coordination game ¯rst with common
knowledge. In section (4) we depart further from Calvo (2003) and introduce private signals
on the fundamentals, allowing us to solve and analyze the private information game.
2.1 The Firms
Following Calvo (1998) and Calvo (2003) each of the in¯nitely many ¯rms produces trad-
able output with a linear homogeneous production function, where tradable capital is the
only production factor. Capital is fully internationally mobile ex ante but immobile after
investment.
The ¯rms maximize their value by choosing between constant growth paths. The value
of the ¯rm is de¯ned as the sum of discounted future cash °ows until in¯nity. Due to the
linear production function, the rate of investment or capital accumulation equals the rate of
output growth. In their optimization ¯rms consider the technology parameter, the tax rate
and the international interest rate as given. Thereby, we ¯nd the following representation of
the value of ¯rm i:7
V
i =
®(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ zi
(r ¡ zi)
(1)
V i represents the ¯rm value, ® is the productivity factor, ¿ is the constant output tax
rate, zi is the variable that the ¯rms can choose: the rate of investment. r represents the
constant international interest rate.




®(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ r
(r ¡ zi)2
The model delivers corner solutions: If the after tax return on capital, ®(1 ¡ ¿) exceeds
the international interest rate, r, it is optimal for a ¯rm to invest as much as possible and
thus grow as fast as possible. If the return on capital is lower than the interest rate, the
¯rm does not accumulate capital at all, it would even borrow as much capital as possible
and invest it abroad. In order for the model to deliver a sensible outcome, it is necessary
to restrain the parameter zi to ¯nite "corners". Following Calvo (2003) the value of zi is
7For a detailed derivation please regard appendix (A.1). The ¯rms expect the tax rate to be constant,
because a sudden stop is unexpected to them. In the light of possible growth collapses and ensuing sudden
stops a di®erent tax policy ¿t might be optimal for the government. Therefore ¯rms would expect the tax
rate to change once a crisis occurs. Calvo (2003) shows that the growth collapse and the sudden stop also
occur in the case when they are foreseen by the ¯rm. So we do not consider the case of an anticipated crisis
here.
5restricted to an interval from [0;z] with z < r, where the lower bound ensures that capital
cannot be unbolted. The upper bound stands for reasonable outcomes with respect to the
valuation of the ¯rms. Especially, as zi signi¯es the constant growth path of the ¯rm, by
bounding it, we rule out the possibility that the ¯rm can outgrow the world market in the
in¯nite horizon.
A ¯rm will not invest if the value of the ¯rm is reduced. So it is su±cient to consider
the sign of the derivative of V i with respect to zi.
sgn
@V i
@zi = sgn[®(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ r] (2)
2.2 The Government
The government inherits a stock of debt, D, which has to be ¯nanced by an output tax. The
tax rate is set such that the future discounted tax revenues cover the amount of debt. This





















The superscript econ indicates that a variable refers to the economy and not to an indi-
vidual i
2.3 The Reduced Form Game between Firms
The mechanical way in which the government sets the tax rate introduces the strategic
complementarity between the ¯rms into the model: the pro¯t of investment for an individual
company positively depends on the rate of investment of all other ¯rms. This can be shown
by solving equation (3) for ¿ and plugging it into (2):
sgn
@V i
@zi = sgn[® ¡ D(r ¡ z
econ) ¡ r] (4)
The return on investment is a positive function of zecon. This results from the burden of
debt repayment being carried by more agents. It is also through the tax setting mechanism
that the investment decision of each ¯rm depends negatively on the state of the fundamentals.
The main mechanism underlying the interaction of agents consists of the fact, that, if
growth is high, the government sets a low tax rate, which in turn sustains high growth.
Analogously, if growth is low, the government has to set a high tax rate holding ¯rms o®
investing, which in turn further induces low growth.
63 The Common Knowledge Game
Let us assume that all the ¯rms and the government know the true values of the relevant
variables. Additionally, as we have shown, that ¯rms either do not invest or invest z a
strategy is de¯ned as ¼i : [ ¸ D; ^ D] ! [0;1]. This means that company i invests in state D
with probability ¼i(D). Because of the mass of players being one, the fraction of players
who invest at a particular state of fundamentals can be expressed as: ¼¡i(D) =
R 1
0 ¼j(D)dj




3.1 High Growth and Low Growth Equilibrium
Equation (4) can be used to illustrate the area of existence of a low growth and a high
growth equilibrium. On the one hand a low growth equilibrium can exist where a ¯rm does
not have an incentive to deviate from its strategy not to invest, given that all the other ¯rms
do not invest. This is the case, when equation (4) displays a negative value in the case that
zecon = z¤0 = 0. When solving for the level of debt, we ¯nd that the low growth equilibrium
exists in the case that the debt is higher than a threshold:




On the other hand a high growth equilibrium exists, when a ¯rm does not have an
incentive to deviate from the strategy to invest, given that the other ¯rms do also invest. In
terms of equation (4) this means that a high growth equilibrium exists, if the signum of the
equation is positive for zecon = z ¤1 = z. Thereby we ¯nd, that the high growth equilibrium
exists below a threshold:




3.2 The Tripartite Classi¯cation of Fundamentals
The level of debt can be classi¯ed into three areas. By de¯nition 0 < z < r and ® > r.
Therefore it is clear from the two equations in section (3.1) that D is bigger than D. Between
the two threshold values, D and D, the two equilibria coexist. Above D only the low growth
equilibrium exists and below D only the high growth equilibrium.
If D is smaller than D, there exists a dominance region of investment, consequently
the economy will be in a high growth equilibrium. If D lies between D and D it is not
clear whether agents can coordinate on the high growth equilibrium or whether coordination
failure occurs and the economy is captured in the low growth equilibrium. If D exceeds D
there is a dominance region of no investment and the economy displays low growth with
certainty. 8 The tripartite classi¯cation of fundamentals is illustrated in ¯gure 1.
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Figure 1: Model set up
Figure (1) shows the existence of the high and the low growth equilibrium as a function
of the level of government debt. In case of common knowledge the model displays an inde-
terminacy between the high and the low growth equilibrium for those levels of debt, where
both equilibria coexist. In section (4) however, we will be able determine a threshold signal
of the debt,D?, below which investors can coordinate to high investment, thus leading to
high growth. Above this level of debt, investors then decide not to invest, thereby inducing
low growth. In the ¯gure the dotted line represents the equilibrium that is found with the
help of the private information game.
4 The Private Information Game
By introducing private, slightly noisy information on the state of the fundamentals we can
eliminate the multiplicity area between D and D and ¯nd a threshold value of the level of
debt, below which all agents coordinate on the high growth equilibrium and above which no
one invests.
In the two following sections we will ¯rst show the uniqueness of the equilibrium and then
analyze how the threshold equilibrium is in°uenced by changes in the technology parameter,
by changes in the international interest rate and by changes in the precision of the private
signal.
4.1 Informational Structure
The players cannot observe the true value of the debt but receive noisy signals Di on the
state of the debt. The true level of debt is uniformly distributed over the interval [ ¸ D; ^ D].
The signals are privately observable and uniformly distributed in an ² surrounding of the
true value of the debt, Di » U[D ¡ ²;D + ²]. The players know the distribution and the
support of D and of the private signals. All ¯rms know about all other ¯rms that they also
receive private signals.
8The fact that the signal on the state of the debt is private, re°ects that agents interpret
o±cially announced values of the government debt di®erently. In addition, the levels of
debt are often revised ex post from o±cial institutions which enforces the importance of the
interpretation of the information and justi¯es the signals on debt being private.
In order to derive a unique equilibrium it is important to make sure that the signal
is informative about the true level of the debt. Otherwise the players would not have an
idea about the true value of debt and about the possible signals that the other players
receive, given their own signal. As shown in Heinemann and Illing (2002) the distributional
assumptions that we make in the current set up ensure that this requirement is ful¯lled.
4.2 Object of Optimization
The ¯rms cannot observe the true value of D in the private information set up, but only
have an expectation about it, given the private signal that they receive.
Due to the fact that the expectation of D and of zecon depend on the private signal the











Therefore, the expectation of the value of the ¯rm depending on the level of investment




® ¡ D(r ¡ zecon) ¡ zi




The optimizing behavior in the private information game is analogous to the behavior
under common knowledge. However, the actions of agents are now based on the signals that
they get or their expectation on the true value of debt given the private signals that they
receive. Also with respect to the optimization of the value of their ¯rm, agents maximize
the expected di®erence in payo®s following from alternative strategies, investing versus non-
investing.9 Now, a strategy is a function of the private signal received, instead of the true
value of the fundamental: ¼i(Di) : [ ¸ D; ^ D] ! [0;1]. As shown before, the extreme strategies
of investing at the maximum versus not investing at all dominate all intermediate strategies.











9In the following this will simply be referred to as payo® di®erence. As in Doenges and Heinemann (2001),
in our model also the payo® of the alternative action depends on the state of the fundamentals and is not
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We know, that in the case of unbiased signals around the true value the expectation of
the true value of an variable given the private signal that individual i receives is the signal
itself: E(DjDi) = Di. Therefore the above expression can be simpli¯ed to:
e U(D
i) = z




In this section we show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique threshold equilibrium D? of the game with imperfect
information, such that all the ¯rms invest if and only if Di · D? and do not invest if
Di > D?.
To prove proposition (1) we proceed in several steps. First of all, we assume that all
agents follow a simple switching strategy. After that we eliminate those strategies that are
dominated beginning at borders of the dominance regions. We can do this based on the
payo® di®erence being strictly monotonically decreasing. Finally, we show that there is only
a unique value of the level of debt for which the payo® di®erence given the private signal
equals zero. This level of debt is the threshold value below which all players invest and above
which, no one does.
A switching strategy, IK, means that a ¯rm invests with probability one if and only if
the signal it receives is below a threshold K and abstains from investing with probability
one, if the signal is above the threshold: 10
IK =
(
1 if Di < K
0 if Di ¸ K
11 (12)
Lemma 1 Under the assumption that in the game with in¯nitely many players of mass one
all follow the same switching strategy, IK, the fraction of players investing, ¼¡i(Dj), can be
replaced by the probability that one player receives a signal smaller than the threshold signal
K, prob(Dj < KjD), in equation (11).
The proof of the Lemma can be found in appendix (A.2). With this, the payo® di®erence
can be expressed in the following way 12:
10By continuity arguments it is possible to show, that such a simple switching strategy is optimal. So one
does not lose generality when imposing it in the ¯rst place.
11In terms of the payo® the behavior of the agents in a single event is irrelevant. Therefore it is also
irrelevant, whether players invest at Di = K or not
12It is important to note, that this probability (as does the fraction of players investing) depends on




® ¡ r ¡ rDi + zE(Dprob(Dj < KjD)jDi)
(r ¡ z)r
(13)
Next, we determine those signals where we can start the elimination of dominated strate-
gies. We see that those signals correspond to the borders of the dominance regions in terms
of the true value of the debt, D and D.13
Due to the strict monotonicity of the payo® di®erence, the lowest possible threshold for
a switching strategy of all the players is D. Analogously, the highest possible threshold is
D. For all Di < D the payo® di®erence is positive, irrespective of the actions of all other
players. As the rationality of the players is common knowledge, not to invest is a dominated
strategy for signals below D. And at the other extreme for all signals Di > D the payo®
di®erence is negative.
Lemma 2 e U(Di;IK) is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private signal Di.
The proof of the lemma can be found in appendix (A.5).
Due to the strategic complementarity between the players the worst scenario that a ¯rm
has to consider, is the case where IK = ID. It means that for all values of debt in the
multiplicity area players choose not to invest although the levels of debt would in case of
coordination on the high growth equilibrium also allow for this. And the best scenario would
be a switching strategy of IK = ID.
By applying the iterated elimination of dominated strategies we are able to cut the
multiplicity area down to a unique threshold signal. The elimination functions as follows:
If a player i receives a signal that is very close to the border of the dominance region the
probability that other players receive signals within the dominance region and thus have a
dominant strategy is very high. Due to the strict monotonicity this su±ces to induce player
i to have a dominant strategy as well. This is true for all the players and therefore one can
add the area between the signal of player i and the former border of the dominance region
to the dominance region. One does this at both ends of the support and iterates this process
until one ¯nds maximum [minimum] signal at which player i is indi®erent between investing
and not, and which is at the same time the threshold of the switching strategy of all other
players.14
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990) in all games with strategic complementarity
the highest and the lowest equilibrium that resist the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies are Nash equilibria. Put the other way round: Nash equilibria can never be
eliminated. Thus ID? and ID
? are the most extreme Nash equilibria of the game. We know
that there is no Nash equilibrium below D
? in which the ¯rms do not invest. On the other
hand side, there is also no Nash equilibrium above D
?
in which the ¯rms invest.
13Details can be found in appendix (A.3).
14For a more formal consideration of the iterative elimination please check appendix (A.4).
11So, due to the strict monotonicity of the payo® di®erence that we have proved in lemma(2)




® ¡ r ¡ rD? + zE(Dprob(Dj < D?)jDi = D?)
(r ¡ z)r
= 0 (14)
has a unique solution.
Lemma 3 Equation (14) has a unique solution.
The proof of the Lemma can be found in appendix (A.6).
This unique solution is:
D
? =





This completes the proof of proposition (1). And we can conclude that the D? that we
have found in equation (15) is the unique threshold equilibrium of the game with private
information.
By applying the methodology of global games we have been able to eliminate the area
of multiplicity. We are now able to predict, for which levels of the fundamental a growth
collapse occurs. In the Calvo set up a growth collapse automatically entails a sudden stop of
capital °ows. So the above analysis not only lays bare how the economy will plunge into a
growth collapse but at the same time explains the onset of a sudden stop of capital °ows. It
is of interest to know how the change of economic variables alters the threshold and thereby
the probability of a sudden stop.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section we analyze how a change in the productivity of the country, a change in the
international interest rate and a change in the noise in the information on the debt in°uence
the value of the threshold equilibrium at which the growth collapse and therefore the sudden
stop take place.
5.1 Changes in the technology parameter ®
First of all we analyze the technology parameter, which is in the model equivalent to the
productivity of capital.
Proposition 2 If the technology parameter, ®, increases, the threshold equilibrium is shifted
to a higher level of debt, ie. a growth collapse and thereby a sudden stop occurs at higher
levels of debt only.









The above expression must always be positive, because z is bounded to be bigger than r.
The result of the di®erentiation means that with increasing productivity the switch from
high to low growth equilibrium only happens for higher levels of debt. Considering the ¯nite
support of the distribution of the debt, this implies that the probability of a growth collapse
decreases and therefore the probability of a sudden stop. In ¯gure (2) this is mirrored by
D0? lying right of D? with ®0 being bigger than ®.
One ¯nds another interesting result when looking at the change of the borders of the
multiplicity area with a change in the technology parameter.
Proposition 3 If the technology parameter, ®, increases, the area of multiplicity of equilib-
ria widens in the common knowledge game.
The derivative of the lower bound of the multiplicity area, D, with respect to ® is smaller





















As illustrated in ¯gure (2) the area of multiplicity enlarges with bigger ®. Between D?
and D is the area, where the low growth equilibrium prevails due to coordination failure,
although in terms of the fundamentals still the high growth equilibrium is possible. One could
argue that the size of this area could be seen as a measure of ine±ciency of the economy.
Then one would argue, that with increasing ® the ine±ciency of the economy increases.
However, this view is incorrect as simultaneously also the area between D and D? increases
by the same amount. For these levels of debt, the investors coordinate to the high growth
equilibrium although also the low growth equilibrium exists. It seems to be more convincing
to state that the overall situation improves because ¯rst of all the probability of a sudden
stop decreases (as argued above) and second, the area between D? and D can be seen as an
area, where the government can improve the situation by helping investors to coordinate.
So we can rather say that technological progress accords a larger scope to government policy
to enhance coordination.
We also see that the e®ect of ® decreases in r. This can be explained by the fact
that the scope of action for the government is reduced, when external factors, such as the
international interest rate, change. It is informative to analyze the direct e®ect of a change
in the international interest rate on the threshold equilibrium.
5.2 Changes in the international interest rate r
Proposition 4 If the international interest rate, r, increases, the threshold equilibrium is
shifted to a lower level of debt, ie. a growth collapse and thereby a sudden stop occurs already
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Figure 2: Changes in D? and the borders of the multiplicity area due to changes in ®




(3 + ²)z ¡ 6®
6(r ¡ 1
2z)2 < 0 (18)
The denominator of the fraction in equation (18) must always be positive. The numerator
is negative for possible values of ® and ². Per de¯nition ® must exceed r, which in turn must
exceed z. ² is restraint to small numbers, for sure smaller than three, which would be the
solution, when setting the numerator to zero for the limiting case that ® = z. The e®ect of
a change of r on D? is negative; i.e. if the international interest rate increases, D? moves to
the left in ¯gure (2). In terms of the real economy this implies that with higher international
interest rates, sudden stops occur for lower levels of debt.
Proposition 5 If the international interest rate, r, increases, the area of multiplicity of
equilibria shrinks in the common knowledge game.
When doing the comparative static analysis at the borders of the multiplicity area one
¯nds that the derivative of D with respect to r is more negative, than the one of D. This
result implies, that the area of multiplicity shrinks with increasing r. With the analogous
argument to the one we used for the comparative statics of ®, we conclude that the scope of
government policies is thereby diminished.
Again we see in this comparative static the opposing e®ects of ® a parameter determined
in the respective country and r, a parameter which is independent of the situation in the
particular country.
These results of the comparative statics with respect to ® and r are fully in line with
the empirical literature on pull and push factors with respect to capital °ows.15 As a large
15cf. e.g. Calvo et al. (1993), Calvo et al. (1996),Diaz-Alejandro (1983), Fernandez-Arias (1996), Montiel
and Reinhart (1999).
14part of the mentioned literature tries to explain the surge of capital in°ows into developing
countries, "pull" refers to the factors that lie inside the economy and attract capital in°ows.
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) de¯ne these capital attracting factors as the ones that operate
through the improvements in the risk-return characteristics of assets issued by the developing
country debtors such as would result from productivity enhancing economic reforms.16 So
in our set up this would mean policies, that lead to an increase of the technology parameter
®.
The most prominent of the "push" factors - which lie in the industrialized countries - is the
world interest rate.17 In their paper on in°ows of capital to developing countries in the 1990s
Calvo et al. (1996) mention that the low interest rates in the developed countries attracted
investors to the high investment yields and improving economic prospects of economies in
Asia and Latin America in the beginning of the 1990s. For example the short term interest
rate in the USA reached its lowest point since the early 1960s in 1992. Fernandez-Arias (1996)
contributes an interesting twist to the question of the in°uence of external factors to capital
°ows to emerging markets by laying bare, the positive e®ect of lower world interest rates on
the creditworthiness of debtor countries that borrow at these rates. This is a further channel
through which low world interest rates may induce capital to °ow into emerging markets.
In the mentioned literature it is disputed, whether the external or internal factors are
more important in the determination of the direction and composition of the °ows. We
cannot determine with our model, whether internal or external factors are more important,
but we can illustrate in our model, that the scope of government policies coping with possible
coordination failures changes as a function of external factors. If the international interest
rate increases governments of developing countries lose scope whereas they gain if the interest
rate falls. We ¯nd in accordance with the empirical literature, that the government can buy
scope of its policies by for example productivity enhancing reforms. But at the same time
we have to say, they lose if the productivity is decreased. This means that we expect the
relative importance of internal versus external factors to vary over time. And we expect this
change to be such that in unfavorable surroundings for the country the government can do
even less.
5.3 Changes in the degree of uncertainty about the fundamentals
on the level of debt ²
Finally, it is interesting to look at the impact of a change in the precision of the information
²:
16In addition Calvo et al. (1993) mention introduction of institutional reforms such as liberalization of the
domestic capital market, opening of the trade account and policies that result in credible increases in the
rate of return on investment.
17As stated in Calvo et al. (1996) additional external factors include terms-of-trade developments, interna-
tional business cycle, regulatory changes that a®ect the international diversi¯cation of investment portfolios
at the main ¯nancial centers.
15Proposition 6 If the degree of uncertainty about the fundamentals, ², increases, the thresh-
old equilibrium is shifted to a lower level of debt, ie. a growth collapse and thereby a sudden
stop occurs already at lower levels of debt.
That proposition (6) holds true can easily be seen by taking the derivative of D? with








For possible values of r the derivative is always negative. This means that D? decreases
with increasing uncertainty. As argued before this in turn implies, that the probability
of a sudden stop increases. Formulated di®erently this means that the more precise the
information, the lower the probability of a bad equilibrium. This result contrasts the ¯ndings
of the "game of re¯nancing".18 In terms of government policies it means, that governments
should aim for a information dissemination policy that entails small variation in the value
of private signals, i.e. that entails little uncertainty about the fundamentals.19
We have shown that there exists a unique threshold equilibrium describing a discontinuous
switch from the high to the low growth equilibrium, i.e. a growth collapse. Additionally, we
have illustrated the comparative statics of this equilibrium. Calvo (2003) extensively explains
how the growth collapse automatically translates into a sudden stop of capital °ows.
6 Testable Implications
Here, we would like to identify the testable implications of the theoretical model so that
we can then verify the predictions regarding the in°uence of technological progress, the
international interest rate and the uncertainty about the fundamentals of the economy on
the probability of a sudden stop.
The ¯rst hypothesis is that sudden stops become less likely if internal factors of emerging
market countries get more favorable, e.g., if the investment safety increases or if governments
adopt technology enhancing policies.
The second hypothesis is that more sudden stops occur if the international interest rate
increases.
The third testable hypothesis is that sudden stops become more probable with more
uncertainty on the fundamentals of the economy.
7 Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is to validate the predictions of the theoretical model. We focus
on showing the e®ect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the occurrence of sudden
18cf.Morris and Shin (2004)
19For an extensive analysis of transparency cf Heinemann and Illing (2002).
16stops of capital °ows.
7.1 The Data
We work with two data sets: A yearly data set of 14 emerging and 17 industrialized countries
and a monthly data set of 11 developing and 14 developed countries. Both sets run from
from January 1990 until December 2001. We work with these two data sets because with
the yearly data we cannot tackle the potential problem of endogeneity due to too little
observations. However, we want to display the results of the analysis with yearly data, as
we do not have all the series of control variables in monthly frequency and use interpolated
series there.
The selection of countries re°ects those emerging countries that are tracked by JP Mor-
gan's Emerging Market Outlook, i.e. countries that signi¯cantly show in the world capital
markets and for the developed countries picks OECD members. In addition some of the
countries that ful¯ll those criteria are dropped due to lack in the relevant data.20
The dependent variable is an index of sudden stops of capital °ows. Following Calvo
et al. (2004) we employ a dummy variable that is based on monthly data of capital °ows.
This high frequency of data is chosen, because it best unveils the origin of crisis episodes.
Due to the high frequency of data however, it is necessary to work with a proxy for the
°ows: Netting out the trade balance from changes in foreign reserves. Then the change in
the capital °ows with respect to the capital °ows 12 months before is calculated to avoid
seasonal e®ects.
The ¯rst criterion that determines whether a month is counted as a crisis month or
not concerns the capital °ows: This criterion is ful¯lled if the year on year fall in capital
°ows undershoots its sample mean by more than two standard deviations. To introduce
persistence in this measure the criterion is also regarded ful¯lled if the °ows fall more than
one standard deviation below the sample mean in the months that encircle the two standard
deviation fall. In addition to this ¯rst criterion, secondly the output of the economy has to
contract at the same time. Thereby, one only picks up crisis episodes with costly disruption
in economic activity. For robustness checks we make also use of the dummy variable, where
only the capital °ow criterion has to be ful¯lled in our analysis.21 In the analysis with yearly
data, a year is counted as a sudden stop year, if it contains at least one month that ful¯lls
the above mentioned criteria.
20For more details cf. the data appendix (A.8).
21There is no consensus in the literature about the concept of capital °ows or the criteria to detect a sudden
stop. While eg. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) examine variations in net private capital °ows, Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (1998) and Hutchison and Noy (2006) analyze changes in the current account. In addition the
measures of the variation in capital °ows di®er. While in one part of the literature negative di®erences are
measured relative to the country's GDP and considered a sudden stop if they exceed a speci¯c threshold (cf.
eg. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Hutchison and Noy (2006)). However, a newer part of the literature also
takes into consideration the unexpected character of such an extreme event and considers a drop in capital
°ows a crisis when it falls below a threshold in terms of the standard deviations below the sample mean
cf. Calvo et al. (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2006). This latter approach is
consistent with our theoretical model and that is why we use it.
17The explanatory variable that we are most interested in, is the uncertainty about the
fundamentals. We use the standard deviation of growth forecasts by a group of country
experts as a measure of uncertainty. In the models a la Morris and Shin (1998) the uncer-
tainty takes the form of the dispersion of the private signals around the true value of the
fundamental. In the current model this is the dispersion of the private signals about the
true value of the government debt, i.e. the evaluation of the value of the government debt by
each of the private investors. One cannot directly observe such data. However, there exist
data that one can use as reliable proxy.
First of all, given the distributional assumptions that we have made in the theoretical
model the expectation of the true value of the debt, given the private signal is exactly the
private signal itself: E(DjDi) = Di. If the private signals are dispersed with a standard
deviation of ² around the true value of the debt, the expectations will as well. Therefore the
standard deviation of the expectations will give a good indication of the standard deviation
of the signals that we are interested in. Data that closely proxies the expectations by private
agents about the fundamentals are available.
Data on the standard deviation of expectations about the level of government debt are not
available in a su±cient coverage. Therefore, we use the standard deviation of expectations
about GDP growth as a proxy. In doing this we follow Prati and Sbracia (2002) who use
these data to test the e®ect of uncertainty on the occurrence of currency crises in a similar
model. In addition, with regard to the fact that our model also works if the uncertainty lies
on the productivity parameter this procedure seems even more justi¯ed.
A second restriction is that there exists no data on the private signals of all investors.
The data collecting ¯rms only survey the opinions of a group of about 20 banks and other
market analysts per country. However, assuming that private investors can buy the opinions
of the experts, it is reasonable, that they will buy di®erent numbers of those opinions and
will weigh these signals di®erently. If the experts strongly diverge in their expectations it is
most likely, that private agents will have even more divergent evaluations of the fundamental.
Therefore the dispersion of the expert opinions, i.e. their standard deviation, seems a good
indicator of the dispersion of private agents' expectations about the fundamentals.
Both data collecting institutions whose data we use, the IFO Institute for Economic and
Consensus Economics collect GDP forecasts of a group of country experts at a particular
point in time and then report mean and standard deviation of these forecasts for the re-
spective country. We use those reported standard deviations as the measure of uncertainty.
When working with yearly data we make use of both data sets. While the IFO institute asks
experts within the countries that they track about their forecasts of GDP growth for the
current year once a year in April, Consensus Economics collects forecasts of GDP growth,
CPI in°ation, government budget balance, current account balance trade balance and ex-
ports for the current and following year in monthly frequency. In the analysis with yearly
data we display two sets of estimations, one, where the measure of uncertainty is a yearly
average of the standard deviations of forecasts that Consensus economics gathers. In the
second set of estimations, we combine the observations by Consensus and WES. We do this
18by only taking the April forecast for the current year by Consensus. If both observations are
available we use the WES data.22
In order to achieve a constant one year forecast horizon for the data by Consensus eco-
nomics, we follow Prati and Sbracia (2002) in computing a weighted average of the current
and the following year forecast. In January a weight of 11=12 is attributed to the current
and of 1=12 to the following year forecast. In February the weights equal 10=12 and 2=12
respectively, for every month in the same logic, another set of weights is applicable until
December were the respective weights are 0/12 and 12/12.23
We use a large set of control variables. First of all, we control for the mean of the growths
forecasts. This seems to be the most important control because we want to disentangle the
e®ect of private investors having diverging opinions as opposed to all being sure that growth
will be low. Additionally, we draw upon Calvo et al. (2004). They convincingly put forward
the vulnerability to large real exchange rate °uctuations and the degree of domestic liability
dollarization as drivers of the occurrence of sudden stops. In addition, we use a large set of
macroeconomic controls. When we work with monthly data we have to interpolate several
time series of the control variables that are only available in yearly frequency. It is clear that
we thereby understate the variance of those series. Since we have monthly observations on
the variables that we are most interested and most of the controls that we have to interpolate
represent economic variables that do not vary substantially in a year's time it is very unlikely
that this fact in°uences the results. In addition, we can show the presence of the e®ect of
the uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden stops of capital °ows with yearly data.
7.2 Benchmark Regression
As a benchmark regression we estimate a pooled probit controlling for country and time
e®ects. The theoretical model is static and predicts the probability of a crisis at a particular
point in time. Therefore a probit approach to estimating the e®ect of the uncertainty on the
occurrence of a crisis seems most appropriate.
Prob(Suddenstop = 1jxit¯) (20)
with i = 1;2;:::;n;t = 1;2;:::;T
Suddenstop equals one if country i experiences a sudden stop in period t. xit represents
the set of explanatory variables, including the measure of uncertainty, ¯ is the vector of the
corresponding coe±cients. G(:) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
We include country dummies into our analysis. The level of uncertainty varies strongly
across countries.24 While in some countries like for example the Netherlands or Italy the av-
22For robustness checks we ran the same regressions also once using WES data only and another time
using a combination where in case of redundance we took the Consensus data. The results are qualitatively
the same and quantitatively similar.
23As a robustness check we rerun all the estimations with the current year and with following year forecasts
separately. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.
24This is illustrated in appendix (A.9).
19erage of the uncertainty measure over the analyzed period from January 1990 till December
2001 is as low as 0.24 standard deviations in countries like Indonesia or Turkey it reaches
levels of 1.022 and 1.15 standard deviations respectively. These statistics suggest that sys-
tematically some countries are characterized by higher uncertainty than other countries and
therefore it is necessary to control for country ¯xed e®ects. In a probit estimation one can
only consistently achieve this by incorporating country dummies into the regression.
Additionally, we control for time ¯xed e®ects. Calvo et al. (2004) in line with a large part
of the literature state that sudden stops in emerging economies bunch around the Tequila
(1994), East Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises. In developed countries they materialize
mostly around the ERM crisis in 1993. The graphs in appendix (A.10), which depict the
sudden stop periods against the measure of uncertainty, also show this feature of the crises.
Thus, controlling for time ¯xed e®ects is necessary. Mostly we do this by including time
dummies in the regressions. However, where the data quality does not allow for this, we
use polynomial time trends to reduce the number of dummy variables and approximate the
variation over time.
7.3 Analysis with Yearly Data
First, we run a pooled probit regression with the sample of all countries with yearly data.
As can be seen in table (1) in appendix (A.11) the coe±cient on the contemporaneous
uncertainty has a positive sign irrespective of the measure of uncertainty that we choose.
Controlling for country and time e®ects the result is signi¯cant.25 However, sudden stops are
mainly an emerging market phenomenon.26 For some of the countries that do not experience
sudden stops of capital °ows the country dummies are dropped from the regression, while the
observations are included. This makes the result look weaker. To circumvent this di±culty
we redo the analysis for emerging economies only. The results are reported in table (2) in
appendix (A.11). Again the e®ect of the uncertainty on the crisis probability is positive and
signi¯cant. However, when working with the uncertainty measure based on the Consensus
data in the case where we include the quadratic time trend, column (3) in the left half of
the table, none of the explanatory variables is signi¯cant. This seems to be related to the
little number of observations of 64. This does not happen with the combined measure of
uncertainty, where we have 97 observations.
In all regressions we control for the mean of the expectations over all the experts. Hereby,
we want to disentangle the self-ful¯lling e®ect of the expectations and actually the uncer-
tainty about the fundamentals, hence the disagreement on the state of the economy. In
most of the regressions the mean of the expectations turn out to signi¯cantly impact the
crisis probability: the lower the mean of the expectations the higher the crisis probability.
The other control variables, namely the domestic liability dollarization, the vulnerability to
25The results stay the same when including higher order time trend. However if including country and
year dummies none of the explanatory variable is signi¯cant, which indicates that one would demand too
much from the data by doing so.
26cf. appendix (A.10)
20real exchange rate °uctuations, the index of exchange rate °exibility, the reserves over the
current account de¯cit, M2 over reserves, credit growth, foreign direct investment over GDP,
public balance over GDP, total debt over GDP and TOT growths,turn out to be insigni¯cant
in many of the regressions once one controls for country ¯xed e®ects.27
We can conclude from the analysis with yearly data that the empirical ¯ndings are in line
with the theoretical model. However, due to data limitation, we cannot tackle one obvious
problem of the analysis: the direction of causality. Here, the monthly data contributes to
¯nding a remedy.
7.4 Analysis with Monthly Data
When repeating the analysis with monthly data we use the one month lag of the explanatory
variables as a ¯rst step to reduce the problem of endogeneity. Additionally, one month seems
an appropriate time on average that investors can act according to their expectations. On
the one hand the capital °ow proxy comprises portfolio investments which are very liquid
and on the other hand foreign direct investment which might be more di±cult to buy or sell.
The regression where we include the entire country sample su®ers from the same di±culty of
dropped country dummies as the counterpart in the regression with yearly data. The result
of these regressions is displayed in table (3). Still, we can see that the sign of the e®ect of
the uncertainty on the occurrence of crises is positive as expected. The most insights can be
won from the pooled probit estimation with monthly data and the emerging market sample.
(Table (4) here)
The results of the analysis with monthly data and the emerging market sample turn out
as expected.28 The lagged uncertainty in°uences the crisis probability positively. The lagged
expectations themselves have the opposite impact. The insigni¯cance of the vulnerability
against real exchange rate °uctuations and the domestic liability dollarization, the variables
that Calvo et al. (2004) put forward as main drivers of sudden stops, may root in the
interpolation of these series from yearly data. However, already in the analysis with yearly
data (cf. appendix A.11, tables (1) and (2)) the two variables do not appear signi¯cant
in a lot of speci¯cations. This ¯nding suggests, that it is di±cult to argue for an analysis
27We show the results with our preferred speci¯cation in terms of the control variables, however, we
have run all the regressions with a larger set of controls and the results are qualitatively the same and
quantitatively similar.
28The result with respect to the uncertainty holds also when applying monthly time dummies into the
analysis. However, most of the other variables get insigni¯cant which can emerge from the fact that part
of them are interpolated from yearly data. Therefore the speci¯cation with time dummies is not displayed
here and not our favorite speci¯cation.
21assuming random e®ects as Calvo et al. (2004) do. 29
The e®ect of the uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden stops is not negligible. To gain
a feeling for the relevance of the topic we calculate the marginal e®ects for the regressions
from table(4). We ¯nd that the e®ect ranges between a 2.5 and 10.8 increase of the crisis
probability when the uncertainty is increased by one unit, thus one standard deviation. Our
favorite speci¯cations are those with a quadratic or cubic time trend. Therefore, we would




In order to be able to dispel the possibility that the above results rather stem from an
endogeneity problem than displaying the e®ect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals
we ¯rst apply higher order lags as explanatory variables. Second, we implement instrumental
variable estimation.
The analysis applying lags of the potentially endogenous variables, namely the uncer-
tainty measure, the mean of the expectations and the vulnerability to real exchange rate
°uctuations reveals that the uncertainty up to four month previous to the crisis period has
a signi¯cant positive e®ect on the probability of a crisis. Earlier uncertainty however does
not matter for a crisis to occur. This pattern does not materialize with respect to the mean
of the expectations and the vulnerability to real exchange rate °uctuations, which both stay
signi¯cant when applying these higher order lags. These results are illustrated in table (6)
in appendix (A.11).
We cannot be sure that a lag of four month is enough to deny possible endogeneity.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a crisis announces itself in all its precipitation four months
prior to the moment where we would count a month as a sudden stop month and thus people
could be certain that a crisis is going to happen. Furthermore, it is also not surprising that
the uncertainty does not have an e®ect for more than four month into the future: If it is
the disagreement between investors about future outcomes at the point of the investment
decision itself that matters, then as we argued before one month should be a good proxy for
the reaction time. To summarize, these results cannot exclude the possibility that the result
is driven by endogeneity but it renders it much less likely.
29The result of the uncertainty in°uencing the crisis probability positively also holds under the assumption
of random e®ects controlling for time e®ects. However, assuming country ¯xed e®ects is more rigorous and
we ¯nd it di±cult to argue for random e®ects in this context.
22The next step in the attempt to cope with the potential endogeneity is to instrument
the contemporaneous variable with its own lag. In the ¯rst stage we regress the uncertainty
measure on its own lag controlling for the same set of controls as in the second stage regres-
sion. Based on the estimated coe±cients, we predict the contemporaneous uncertainty. In
the second stage we employ the predicted values along with the control variables that we are
interested in.
The results in table (7) in appendix (A.11) suggest that the uncertainty does have an
aggravating e®ect on the probability of a crisis. Here, we display the results where we used
the six month lags of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. We did the same
analysis with lower and higher order lags. The results are similar for lower order lags. For
higher order lags however they break down. Then, under some speci¯cations the lags are not
signi¯cant in the ¯rst stage regressions any more and under other speci¯cations the predicted
values do not signi¯cantly explain the occurrence of a crisis. Keeping in mind the fast speed
in which a lot of the crises burst out it seems that a lag of six months is a su±cient distance
to exclude the causality from the crisis to the uncertainty. In addition, and this also applies
already to the argument when explaining the results with the lagged explanatory variables,
we control for the mean expectations and also for time e®ects which ensure further that we
are not picking up the reverse causality by the uncertainty variable. Hence, we consider the
analysis with lagged explanatory variables as well as the instrumental variable estimation
as further indication for the validity of the theoretical ¯ndings. One additional possibility
to avoid the endogeneity might be to look for past data revisions as an instrument for the
uncertainty. However, there might be also a problem, that revisions of data often happen in
sight of a crisis to smooth outcomes etc.
7.6 Robustness Analysis
We report one additional set of estimations in order to assure ourselves that the results are
not sensitive to the econometric method that we have chosen. Table (8) in appendix (A.11)
reports the results of these estimations. Additionally to the pooled probit that we chose
as a benchmark case we estimate a pooled logit controlling for country and time e®ects,
a conditional logit in a panel setting with ¯xed e®ects and a Chamberlain's Panel probit
estimations. All these approaches have in common that one controls for country speci¯c
e®ects. Applying the logit estimation implies employing the logistic function instead of the
normal cumulative distribution function as in the probit approach. The conditional logit
allows for a ¯xed e®ects estimation which is not possible in a probit setting. A ¯xed e®ects
estimation in a probit setting leads to inconsistent coe±cient estimates as the country e®ects
cannot cancel out when they are within the cumulative distribution function. The problem
is less in the case of the logistic function. When using Chamberlain's panel probit approach
one allows for the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the mean of each of the
explanatory variables which is calculated by country and included into the estimation as
23further control. Therefore this mean functions similar to a country dummy. 30
As table (8) in appendix (A.11) illustrates the positive e®ect of the uncertainty on the
occurrence of sudden stops is robust against di®erent estimation approaches. In addition we
see that the negative e®ect of the expectations themselves is also robust.
We have run all the regressions also with the complete list of control variables (cf.
appendix(A.8)). The results do not qualitatively and quantitatively change when includ-
ing the additional variables. The speci¯cation that we show here is our preferred one and
we rather illustrate di®erent speci¯cations in terms of the control for time e®ects (including
time trends of di®ering order). We have chosen this approach because part of the series of
control variables are interpolated and therefore the data quality does not always allow to
include the 144 monthly time dummies in the regressions.
Furthermore, we run all the above regressions with an alternative measure of sudden
stops. Namely, we redo the analysis counting a month a sudden stop month when the criteria
regarding the drop in capital °ows are ful¯lled and ignoring whether growth is positive or
negative in the respective period. The results from this analysis are quantitatively the same
as the ones that we report here.
We conclude the empirical ¯ndings by stating that in the analysis with the yearly data we
have seen that contemporaneously the uncertainty a®ects the crisis probability signi¯cantly
and positively. However with yearly data we cannot not resolve the di±culty of possible
endogeneity. By calculating the marginal e®ects we can also show that the e®ect that we
are showing is not negligible quantitatively. In order to circumvent the issue of endogeneity
we switch to monthly data and ¯rst apply higher order lags as explanatory variables. In a
further step we perform two stage estimation with the lags of the potentially endogenous
variables serve as instruments. This works for lags up to six months. Additionally we check
for di®erent estimation approaches.
Summarizing the empirical results we understand them as a support for our theoretical
prediction. The uncertainty about the fundamentals increases the probability of a sudden
stop of capital °ows.
8 Policy implications
To round o® our analysis we now want to discuss what our theoretical and empirical results
imply in terms of economic policies.
8.1 Implications Regarding the Technology Parameter and the
International Interest Rate
We have seen that an increase in the technology parameter decreases the probability of a
crisis. Hence this implies that governments should try to enhance technological progress and
30For a detailed description cf. Wooldridge (2002), pages 487f.
24thus make their country more interesting for investment. Also in this context the safety
of investment seems crucial so that investors can realize a high after tax return on their
investment. In the same strand high tax policies seem counterproductive. To summarize, all
steps toward a credible increase in the long term rate of return on investment help prevent
crises. An interesting implication of our analysis is that apart from the direct e®ect of an
increase in the technology parameter a government can buy scope for other policies that help
private investors to coordinate on the good equilibrium if they increase this parameter.
The international interest rate is not under the control of one economy. We rather refer to
small open economies in our analysis. Our ¯ndings in this context imply that governments
should take into consideration that they have even less scope for action once the outside
world turns unfavorable, ie. if the international interest rate increases. So they should take
precautions for such cases.
8.2 Implications regarding the Uncertainty about the Fundamen-
tals
We have found that private information with little noise is the most favorable setting for an
economy. So it should be in the interest of the government to achieve such an informational
structure. We have modelled the government as mechanically servicing its debt in a static
model so we have abstracted from problems of credibility or commitment. Therefore, we can
only infer policy implications for a credible government. We do not cover mechanisms how
governments could achieve credibility. One venue how a credible government could achieve
a setting in which investors decide upon private information would be to allow full access
to government data to a small group of independent economic rating agencies to gather all
relevant information on the fundamentals. These agencies could then sell their signals to
private investors. The private agents could buy signals of di®erent agencies and weigh those
according to their own judgement or preferences. This would make sure that signals that
the investors in the market have about the fundamentals would be private and characterized
by a small amount of noise.
9 Conclusion
In the present paper we have added the possibility of coordination failure between investors as
a factor triggering a sudden stop and have veri¯ed our ¯nding empirically. More speci¯cally,
we can show that an increased uncertainty about the fundamentals of an economy increases
the probability of a sudden stop of capital °ows.
The main theoretical ¯ndings of the present paper are, that the probability of a sudden
stop decreases with technological progress. It increases with a higher international interest
rate. And it also increases with noisier private signals which can be interpreted as higher
uncertainty or disagreement about the fundamentals among private investors. With regard
to the discussion on internal versus external factors, that attract capital to emerging mar-
25kets, we ¯nd that with increasing international interest rate, the scope of policy action,
preventing a sudden stop, is reduced. In contrast to this result, with technological progress,
the government gains scope for its actions. Thus in terms of the discussion regarding pull
and push factors of capital °ows, we ¯nd, that the relative importance of those factors vary
over time in an unfavorable way for the concerned economies. When the external conditions
are unfavorable governments have less possibility to in°uence the economic outcome, by for
example helping private investors to coordinate on the good equilibrium.
It has to be mentioned, that in the present paper, we have not included considerations
about default and thereby credit frictions. Furthermore, we have not extended the non-
monetary model to one with money. Calvo (2003) illustrates these extensions in his model.
In the mentioned paper Calvo also shows, that foreseen crisis are also possible in the model.
The introduction of in¯nitely many ¯rms and the coordination problem do not alter these
considerations. Banking crises however, cannot be rationalized within the current framework.
In a second step we have reviewed the theoretical ¯ndings empirically. Our focus is on the
e®ect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the occurrence of a sudden stop of capital
°ows. We can verify the theoretical result by a pooled probit analysis controlling for country
and time e®ects. Calculating marginal e®ects we can also show that the in°uence of the
uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden stops is quantitatively not negligible. Additionally
we execute a rich set of robustness checks. These include two stage estimations to address
the possible endogeneity problem. In all these regressions we can show a positive e®ect of
the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability of the occurrence of a crisis.
These results strongly suggest, that governments should take the uncertainty about the
fundamentals in the economy into account. Lower precision of information about the gov-
ernment's ¯scal policy and therefore uncertainty about these values increases the probability
of a sudden stop of capital °ows. Hence an economy will be more vulnerable in times, when
uncertainty is higher, and policymakers should adjust their policies. Speci¯cally, the provi-
sion of less noisy private information seems crucial in this context. One venue would be to
allow full access to all government data to a small set of independent agencies which could
then sell their ratings to private investors. The set up that we are looking at is static so we
abstract from problems of credibility or commitment.
There are two extensions of the theoretical model. First, it could be interesting to add
the assumption of public information about the level of the debt to the assumption of private
information of each investor. So far we have assumed, that agents base their decision on
their personal interpretation of publicly available information, that is each investor does not
know, how the other investors interpret the available information. Morris and Shin (2004),
Metz (2002) and Hellwig (2002) include public information that is common knowledge to all
players into their analysis. However, it is questionable whether we would generate di®erent
implications in the present set up. A vivid discussion on the interaction between public and
private information exists in the context of central bank policy. It was triggered by Morris
and Shin (2004).
Second, it would be insightful to analyze the distinction between domestic and foreign
26investors: How would the probability of a sudden stop be in°uenced if the signals of domes-
tic and foreign investors are di®erently dispersed around the true value of the debt? Are
economies with investors that di®er with regard to the precision of their information more
prone to crisis than economies with homogenous and only domestic investors? One could
gain a ¯rst idea of an possible outcome looking at Corsetti et al. (2004) who analyze the e®ect
of the presence of one big investor who is better informed than the rest on the occurrence
of currency crises.
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t is ¯rm i's output in period t, ® is the productivity factor and Ki
t is the capital
invested.
Period t cash °ow of ¯rm i:
S
i
t = ®(1 ¡ ¿)K
i
t ¡ _ K
i
t (21)
where ¿ represents a constant output tax rate and _ K the rate of capital accumulation,
neglecting capital depreciation.









where r represents the constant international interest rate.
zi is de¯ned as zi =
_ Ki
Ki.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
With the switching strategy IK the fraction of players investing is: ¼¡i(IK) =
R 1
0 IK(Dj)dj.
Thereby, for the expected value in equation (11) becomes: E(D¼¡i(Dj)jDi) = E(D¼¡i(IK)jDi).
By the use of the law of iterated expectations and the fact that D is more precise
information than the private signals Di and Dj, we know that:31











As the signals, given D, are independent of each other, the expected fraction of players
that receive a signal smaller than some threshold K is equal to the probability that one




, which proves the lemma.
A.3 Starting Signals for the Iterated Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
The support of the distribution of the true value of the debt [ ¸ D; ^ D] exceeds D and D (the
borders of the multiplicity area in terms of the true value of the fundamentals which were











i = D) = D and E(Dj D
i = D) = D
this implies that D
0 = D and D
0
= D.
If agent i receives a signal of exactly D, and even in the worst case that the probability
of another agent investing was zero, the payo® di®erence equals 0 given this signal.32
A.4 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
One starts the elimination at the borders of the multiplicity area.







0 = D, such that:
e U(D
i;ID










0 it also holds that D
1
> D
1. For the case of the upper border of the
variable X conditional on a small information set ­2, E(Xj­2) is equivalent to the conditional expecta-
tion given this smaller set ­2 of the conditional expectation given the bigger information set ­3 of X:
E(E(Xj­3)j­2)
32Plug the right hand side of equation (6) into equation(13) and set prob(Dj < KjD)jDi = 0)
30multiplicity area this means: Given that the other players do not invest when receiving
signals above D
0
the investment does not pay for signals above D
1
either. Where we ¯nd D
1
by calculating e U(Di = D
1
;ID
0). This process can be iterated. Given that the other players
do not invest when receiving signals above D
n






. The signals D
n+1
are found by setting the expected payo® di®erence to 0,





i® ¡ r ¡ rD
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is decreasing, monotone and bounded. By the common knowledge of











?) = 0 (24)
D
?
has the interpretation that above this signal all players do not invest with certainty.
At the lower bound of the multiplicity area the analogue situation occurs, just with the
sequence D
n being increasing. There one iterates until one ¯nds:
e U(D
?;ID?) = 0 (25)
.
That means, one iterates until one ¯nds maximum [minimum] signal at which player i
is indi®erent between investing and not, and which is at the same time the threshold of the




The switching strategies ID? and ID
? are Nash equilibria of the private information game.
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990) in all games with strategic complementarity the
highest and the lowest equilibrium that resist the iterative elimination of dominated strate-




? there exists an unambiguous signal D?, below which in equilibrium all players
will invest and above which no one does.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The monotonicity of e U in Di is a necessary condition for the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies to work and to make sure, that there are not several values for which equation
(14) holds.
The factor z 1
(r¡z)r is positive, thus we focus on the rest of the expression.
It is clear that the term ¡rDi is strictly decreasing in Di:
@(¡zrDi)
@Di = ¡r < 0
31.
It is more di±cult to show the characteristics of the term E(D ¤ prob(Dj < KjD)jDi):
Making use of the distributional assumptions that we made with regard to the true value
of debt and the private signal, we can write the conditional density of the private signal





2² if D ¡ ² · Di · D + ²
0 otherwhise
(26)
Therefore, we can write prob(Dj < KjD) as:
prob(D




0; if K < D ¡ ²
1
2²(K ¡ D + ²); if D ¡ ² · K · D + ²
1; if K > D + ²
(27)
Now, in addition referring to the conditional density of the true value of debt given the





2² if Di ¡ ² · D · Di + ²
0 otherwhise
(28)
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2² ¤ 1dD; if Di + 2² < K
(29)
The value of the conditional probability depends on the relative position of K to D and
therefore the expectation of it given Di also depends on the relative position of K to Di.
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; if Di · K · Di + 2²
Di; if D + 2² < K
(30)
32We have shown that the term ¡rDi is strictly monotonically decreasing in Di. In addition
we know, that z < r. Hence, for the monotonicity of the expected payo® di®erence between
investing and not investing,e U(Di;IK), it is su±cient that the derivative of the expected value
that we are analyzing is smaller or equal to 1. The derivatives for the di®erent intervals of
the expected value are the following:
@E(D ¤ prob(Dj < KjD)jDi)
@Di =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :




(Di)2 ¡ (3² + K)Di
+(2²2 + K²)
¢




¡ (Di)2 ¡ (3² ¡ K)Di
+(2²2 + K²)
¢
; if Di · K · Di + 2²
1; if D + 2² < K
(31)
For the cases of K < Di ¡ 2 ¤ ² and D + 2² · K it is clear that the derivatives are 0 or
1 respectively and hence that e U(Di;IK) is monotone decreasing in Di in these intervals.
For the case that Di ¡ 2² · K · Di, the derivative is a positive quadratic function
(U-shape) in Di. So the derivative will take its maximum value at either of the borders of
the analyzed interval.
















if K ¸ ¡². This
is the maximum value that the derivative takes in the mentioned interval. ² is a very small
positive number and K is bound to be positive by the support of D, hence the restriction is
not binding.
So we can conclude that also in the interval of Di ¡ 2² · K · Di the expected payo®
di®erence is monotonically decreasing.










is a negative quadratic function in Di (inverse U-shape). So it is necessary to ¯nd out how
the function looks in the relevant interval, especially, whether the maximum of the function
lies within it. This can be analyzed by taking the second derivative of the expected value. If
it is positive over the entire interval one knows, that the analyzed interval is entirely located
on the increasing branch of the function. Hence the function takes the maximum value
at the upper limit of the interval. Accordingly, for an entirely negative second derivative
the interval lies in the decreasing branch and the function will take its maximum value at
the lower limit of the interval. If the second derivative changes sign the situation is more
complicated. Then has to ¯nd the maximum of the function.






i ¡ 3² + K)
This is a linear function in Di. Plugging in the borders of the interval, we can determine
the sign over the interval: at K ¡ 2² the function takes the value 1
4²2(¡K + ²) < 0 if K ¸ ².
As the upper bound of the dominance region where all players invest, D, is at least ² bigger
than ¸ D and a signal within the dominance region cannot be a switching signal, the restriction
of K ¸ ² is not binding.
At K the second derivative takes the value of 1
4²2(¡K¡3²) < 0 if K > ¡3², where clearly
the restriction is not binding. So the interval that we are interested in is entirely located in
the declining branch of the negative quadratic function of the ¯rst derivative of the expected
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This is su±cient to proof monotonicity. We conclude that the expected payo® di®erence
is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private signal Di.
To complete the evaluation of the function at the borders of the interval and thereby
completing the proof of continuity of the ¯rst derivatives, we also show the value of the






















· 1 if K ¸ ¡². This is the same value as
when we evaluated the lower bound K for the interval Di ¡ 2² · K · Di. At all borders
of intervals, the derivatives coincide; this indicates the continuity of the ¯rst derivatives and
shows the smoothness of the expected value. One can show continuity for the expected value
itself as well.
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; if Di · K · Di + 2²
1; if D + 2² · K
(32)
Adding the two terms that are dependent on Di, we ¯nd, that e U(Di;IK) is strictly
monotonically decreasing in Di.
q.e.d.
34A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Finding the solution to equation (14) implies setting K = Di = D? in equation (29). It is
straight forward that we do not have to take into consideration the cases where K < Di¡2²
and K > Di + 2². From equation (29) we see that for K = Di = D? the second term in the









In the case of Di · K · Di+2² the ¯rst term disappears and the second term is identical
with expression (33).
























With this result, we can simplify equation (14) to become:
e U(D
?) = z





Solving for D? delivers the unique value:
D
? =






Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico,  Peru, 
Thailand, Turkey
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Sweden, USA
Consensus Economics Forecasts 
(Consensus Economics)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South 
Africa
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, USA
World Economic Survey (IFO 
Institute)
Emerging Markets Countries Industrialized Countries
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico,  Peru, 
Thailand, Turkey
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Sweden, USA
Consensus Economics Forecasts 
(Consensus Economics)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South 
Africa
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, USA
World Economic Survey (IFO 
Institute)
Emerging Markets Countries Industrialized Countries






Capital flow proxy: Monthly data on trade balance minus changes in international reserves. 
Evaluated in 1995 US dollars
Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004), 
CIM(2004): IMF: IFS
Yearly Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product  CIM (2004): IMF: IFS
Explanatory Variable: 
Uncertainty measure positive
Monthly data of the weigthed average of the standard deviations of the current and following year 
forecast of ecomic growth. The standard deviation is calculated for the expectations that experts 
for the specific economy utter at a particular point in time. In January the standard deviation of 
the current year forecasts is weighted with 11/12 and the standard deviation of the following year 
forecasts with 1/12. In February the current year value receives 10/12 weight and the following 
year one 2/12. This scheme continues until December with a weighting of 0/12 for the current 
year value and 12/12 for the following year value. When working with yearly data, we build the 
mean of the 12 monthly values.  Consensus Economics 
Control Variables:
Vulnerability to real exchange rate fluctuations positive
As shown in Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004), the fraction of the current account deficite relative to 
the demand for tradable goods in an economy is a good indicator for the vulnerability against real 
exchange rate fluctuations. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage fall in the demand 
for tradables needed to close the current account gap. CIM(2004)
 The sum of agricultural and industrial output minus exports is used to proxy imports and the part 
of tradable output that is consumed domestically. The share of this tradable output is built relative 
to total GDP at constant prices. Then the share of tradale output in total output is multiplied with 
the total dollar GDP.  Worldbank: WDI
Current account deficit IMF: WEO
Domestic Liability Dollarization positive Developed countries: Local asset positions in foreign currency by BIS reporting banks as a share 
of GDP. EMs: Dollar deposits plus bank foreign borrowing as a share of GDP.
CIM (2004): BIS, Honohan and Shi (2002), 
Central Banks of Australia, New Zealand, 
Columbia, Korea, Brazil, IMF: IFS
TOT growth negative Terms of trade on goods and services, annual rate of change CIM (2004): Worldbank: WEO
Total Debt over Revenues positive CIM (2004)
Devoloped countries: Public debt from OECD. EMs: WDI; Gross central government debt OECD, Worldbank: WDI
Revenues of the central government IMF: WEO
Reserves over CAD negative CIM (2004)
International reserves IMF: IFS
Current account deficit IMF: WEO
Ex. Regime 3  positive Exchange rate regime classification into 3 categories: 1=float, 2= intermediate, 3= fix Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)
Ex. Regime 5  positive
Exchange rate regime classification into 5 categories: 1=inconclusive, 2= float, 3= dirty, 
4=dirty/crawling peg, 5= fix Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)
Credit Growth negative Credit to private sector, annual rate of change CIM (2004): IMF: IFS
FDI/GDP negative Net foreign direct investment CIM (2004): IMF: IFS
Public Balance/GDP  positive Balance of general government CIM (2004): IMF: WEO




Mean (over time) of 
mean (over experts) of 
growth expectations by 
country
Max (over time) of 
mean (over experts) of 
growth expectations by 
country
Min (over time) of mean 
(over experts) of growth 
expectations by country
Mean (over time) of 
standard deviation (over 
experts) of growth 
expectations by country 
Max (over time) of 
standard deviation (over 
experts) of growth 
expectations by country 
Min (over time) of 
standard deviation (over 
experts) of growth 
expectations by country 
Number of months that 
are counted as sudden 
stops
Argentina 3.29 6.45 -3.30 0.87 2.80 0.37 26
Australia 3.14 4.26 1.14 0.51 0.94 0.24 8
Brazil 2.69 4.67 -2.80 0.76 1.73 0.33 0
Canada 2.75 3.86 -0.15 0.42 0.70 0.15 0
Chile 5.20 8.93 2.10 0.49 0.80 0.24 12
Colombia 3.30 5.30 0.95 0.58 1.12 0.25 12
Czech Republic 2.76 5.28 0.25 0.53 0.93 0.28 3
France 2.37 3.56 0.38 0.27 0.58 0.14 0
Germany 2.02 4.06 -0.55 0.33 0.64 0.11 5
Indonesia 4.63 7.56 -7.71 1.02 3.32 0.18 11
Italy 2.07 3.37 0.62 0.24 0.51 0.06 0
Japan 1.71 4.91 -0.96 0.67 1.30 0.21 12
Mexico 3.43 5.48 -1.60 0.58 1.17 0.20 7
Netherlands 2.48 3.81 0.71 0.24 0.51 0.09 0
New Zealand 2.68 4.04 1.49 0.53 0.95 0.30 0
Norway 2.44 3.81 0.34 0.47 0.94 0.23 0
Peru 4.07 6.90 -1.35 0.67 1.20 0.30 6
South Korea 5.83 7.96 -1.40 0.82 2.11 0.20 11
Spain 2.85 4.65 0.50 0.24 0.38 0.10 9
Sweden 1.76 2.84 0.70 0.26 0.60 0.14 14
Switzerland 1.76 2.84 0.70 0.26 0.60 0.14 0
Thailand 4.15 8.53 -3.31 0.95 2.84 0.25 19
Turkey 3.23 5.38 -0.97 1.15 1.90 0.59 26
United Kingdom 2.11 3.42 -0.17 0.42 0.85 0.19 0
United States 2.53 4.13 -0.14 0.37 0.76 0.13 12
37A.10 Graphs Sudden Stops versus Uncertainty






































































Switzerland - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Netherlands - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 






































































































































































New Zealand - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Czech Republik - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uncertainty 4.227*** 4.894* 6.688* 0.632* 1.340* 1.092
(1.104) (2.644) (3.718) (0.328) (0.795) (0.795)
mean expectation 0.034 -0.565 -1.539 -0.313*** -0.697*** -0.750***
(0.122) (0.425) (1.035) (0.080) (0.252) (0.261)
lag of RER vuln -1.104 20.705 -16.247 2.194 64.480** 58.756**
lag of DLD -14.942*** -41.949** -70.996** -0.628 29.896* 30.147**
int. RER vuln DLD 114.247*** 199.502** 482.341** 62.741** -164.842 -155.958
Ex. Regime 5 -0.138 0.571 2.439 -0.169 0.632* 0.700**
lag res over CAD 0.001 0.027 0.034 -0.001 0.023 0.019
lag M2 over reserves -0.049* -0.089 -0.575 -0.069* -0.210 -0.224
lag credit growth 0.112 -1.818 -4.670 0.769 4.030 2.956
lag FDI/GDP -15.205 -35.652 -8.392 -16.397* -19.395 -24.774
country dummies no yes yes no yes yes
linear time tr. no no yes** no no yes
quadr. time tr. no no yes** no no yes
Constant -2.093** -0.974 -5.874 -0.495 -7.947* -8.427*
(0.911) (2.917) (9.658) (0.764) (4.313) (4.507)
Observations 194 84 84 277 137 137
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Probit - Yearly Data
All Countries - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Uncertainty Measure: Consensus Uncertainty Measure: Combination Consensus WES
Table 1: Estimation with Yearly Data - All Countries' Sample
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
uncertainty 5.890*** 9.637** 159.486 0.814* 2.011* 3.497**
(1.822) (4.028) (71,842.597) (0.444) (1.065) (1.758)
mean exp 0.311 -1.071 -37.497 -0.244** -0.458* -0.490
(0.191) (1.151) (4,422.012) (0.100) (0.268) (0.421)
lag of RER vuln 10.654 14.230 -899.803 15.429* 67.434* 124.065
lag of DLD -13.805* -80.466 -1,566.751 5.289 31.087 56.144
int. RER vuln DLD 82.528 438.659 9,034.767 12.653 -161.271 -455.848
Ex. Regime 5 -0.276 1.109 50.569 -0.057 0.742* 0.904*
lag res over CAD 0.022* 0.055 -0.853 0.008 0.01 0.041
lag M2 over reserves 0.089 0.024 14.904 -0.072 1.419 3.899
lag credit growth -0.097 3.666 157.022 1.278 3.223 12.316
lag FDI/GDP -25.805 -84.541 -1,675.585 -28.623 -9.163 -76.614
country dummies no yes yes no yes yes
linear time trend no no yes no no yes
quadratic time tr. no no yes no no yes
Constant -4.838*** -0.469 -119.757 -2.392 -13.376 -40.099*
(1.827) (8.049) (135873.81) (1.508) (8.284) (23.292)
Observations 77 64 64 115 97 97
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Probit - Yearly Data
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Uncertainty Measure: Consensus Uncertainty Measure: Combination Consensus WES
Table 2: Estimation with Yearly Data - Emerging Countries' Sample
40(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lag uncertainty 2.06*** 1.021*** 1.068*** 0.473 0.503 0.551
(0.200) (0.353) (0.363)  (0.374) (0.381) (0.381)
lag of mean exp -0.198*** -0.523*** -0.544*** -0.638*** -0.648*** -0.622***
(0.035) (0.062) (0.065) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
lag of RER vuln -0.525 3.494 3.956 0.455 -0.354 0.121
lag of DLD -3.543*** -7.638*** -8.247*** -4.296 -3.567 -3.895
int. RER vuln DLD 55.443*** 53.616*** 55.504*** 72.544*** 78.018*** 73.776***
Ex. Regime 5 -0.153 0.134 0.125 0.095 0.087 0.071
lag res over CAD 0.006*** 0.02*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024***
lag M2 over res -0.003 -0.055** -0.054** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.071***
lag credit growth -1.833* -3.28** -3.503** -3.927*** -4.121*** -4.174***
lag FDI/GDP 1.561 -4.023 -5.066 15.955 16.78 10.174
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
month dummies no no yes yes yes yes
linear time trend no no no yes*** yes yes
quadratic time tr. no no no no yes* yes
cubic time tr. no no no no no yes
Constant -1.894 -0.074 0.134 2.494 1.644 2.623
(0.220)***   (0.572) (0.631) (0.815)***    (0.935)*  (1.155)**
Observations 2258 1217 1217 1217 1217 1217
Standard errors in Parantheses, *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
Pooled Probit - Monthly Data
All Countries - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Table 3: Estimation with all Countries' Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lag uncertainty 1.077*** 1.368*** 1.545*** 1.140*** 1.157*** 1.188*** 1.169** 0.941*
(0.31) (0.384) (0.407) (0.429) (0.428) (0.459) (0.464) (0.482)
lag of mean exp -0.258*** -0.381*** -0.391*** -0.473*** -0.458*** -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.469***
(0.048) (0.065) (0.068) (0.077) (0.076) (0.083) (0.083) (0.088)
lag of RER vuln -0.574 0.725 0.853 -2.214 -2.842 -2.231 -2.547 -2.767
lag of DLD -0.213 -6.390** -7.166** -5.511 -4.338 4.212 3.845 8.354
int. RER vuln DLD 44.532*** 58.712*** 62.125*** 78.863*** 76.978*** 63.848*** 65.458*** 58.846***
Ex. Regime 5 -0.134** 0.116 0.1 0.083 0.051 0.111 0.117 0.052
lag res over CAD 0.028*** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034***
lag M2 over reserves 0.182*** 0.222** 0.247** 0.260** 0.295** 0.229* 0.235* 0.225*
lag credit growth -1.024 -2.898* -2.577 -2.960* -3.105* -3.484* -3.507* -3.742**
lag FDI/GDP -15.750*** -2.008 -3.53 12.357 -0.788 -20.184 -19.751 -23.257
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
month dummies no no  yes yes*** yes* yes*** yes yes**
linear time trend no no no yes*** yes* yes*** yes yes**
quadr. time trend no no no no yes yes*** yes yes**
cubic time trend no no no no no yes*** yes yes**
fourth order time trend no no no no no no yes yes**
fifth order time trend no no no no no no no yes**
Constant -1.475*** -1.163* -1.146 0.536 -2.45 -24.872*** -18.232 -266.830**
Observations 837 689 689 689 689 689 689 678
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Probit - Monthly Data
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Table 4: Estimation with Monthly Data - Emerging Countries' Sample
41(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lag uncertainty 0.108*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.025*** 0.09**
(0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.068)
lag of mean exp -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.010*** -0.03***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017)
lag of RER vuln 0.059 -0.124 -0.137 -0.046 -0.15
lag of DLD -0.507** -0.308 -0.209 0.087 0.68
int. RER vuln DLD 4.655*** 4.411*** 3.704*** 1.324*** 3.16
Ex. Regime 5 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003
lag res over CAD 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005***
lag M2 over reserves 0.018** 0.015** 0.014** 0.005* 0.013
lag credit growth -0.230* -0.166* -0.149* -0.072* -0.146
lag FDI/GDP -0.159 0.691 -0.038 -0.419 -2.23
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
month dummies no yes yes yes no
linear time trend no yes yes yes no
quadratic time tr. no no yes yes no
cubic time tr. no no no yes no
fourth order time tr. no
time dummies yes
Observations 689 689 689 689 420
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Probit - Monthly Data - marginal effects
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Table 5: Marginal E®ects for the Estimation with Monthly Data and Emerging Markets
lag explanatory variables 1. lag 2. lag 3. lag 4. lag 5. lag 6. lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lag uncertainty 1.188*** 1.345*** 1.179*** 0.822** 0.35 0.038
(0.459) (0.444) (0.42) (0.398) (0.39) (0.393)
lag of mean exp -0.497*** -0.457*** -0.395*** -0.320*** -0.240*** -0.179**
(0.083) (0.081) (0.077) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072)
lag of RER vuln -2.231 1.692 6.294** 11.713*** 19.231*** 26.315***
lag of DLD 4.212 6.564 9.001* 12.190** 15.833*** 17.385***
int. RER vuln DLD 63.848*** 50.477*** 25.93 -6.465 -48.207*** -77.978***
Ex. Regime 5 0.111 0.108 0.078 0.081 0.086 0.08
lag res over CAD 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.040***
lag M2 over reserves 0.229* 0.218* 0.183 0.109 -0.004 -0.063
lag credit growth -3.484* -5.854*** -4.812*** -3.900*** -2.798** -2.388*
lag FDI/GDP -20.184 -19.906 -16.766 -21.202 -33.914*** -44.941***
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
month dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
linear time trend yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
quadratic time trend yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
cubic time trend yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Constant -24.872*** -27.880*** -27.670*** -27.591*** -27.948*** -28.148***
Observations 689 680 671 662 653 644
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Probit Estimation - Monthly Data
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Table 6: Di®erent Lags
42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
predicted lag of uncertainty 2.593*** 3.130*** 3.094*** 3.501*** 3.432*** 3.576***
(0.59) (0.683) (0.705) (0.677) (0.678) (0.717)
predicted lag of mean exp -0.053 -0.277** -0.309*** -0.281** -0.281** -0.300**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.114) (0.115) (0.113) (0.119)
predicted lag of RER vuln 16.142*** 17.188*** 16.971*** 12.019* 9.938 12.477*
lag of DLD 2.952 -12.083** -12.176** -12.912** -11.822** -2.428
interaction RER vuln DLD -22.008 12.921 15.717 46.79 52.266 27.906
Ex. Regime 5 -0.202*** -0.023 -0.026 -0.011 -0.027 0.043
lag res over CAD 0.036*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.033***
lag M2 over reserves 0.069 0.12 0.145 0.187* 0.210* 0.132
lag credit growth -1.167 -2.472 -2.121 -2.56 -2.717 -2.685
lag FDI/GDP -21.971*** 2.336 1.4 18.065 12.075 -13.036
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
month dummies no no  yes yes yes yes
linear time trend no no  no yes yes yes***
quadratic time tr. no no  no no yes yes***
cubic time tr. no no  no no no yes***
fourth order time tr. no no  no no no no
time dummies no no  no no no no
Constant -3.545*** -3.139*** -2.957*** -2.720* -4.399** -31.161***
Observations 777 610 610 610 610 610
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Instruments are the six months lags of the uncertainty, of the mean of the expectations and of the vulnerability to real e
The instruments are significant at least at the 10% level in the first stage regressions
Pooled Probit IV Estimation - Monthly Data
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lag uncertainty 1.157*** 1.188*** 2.072** 1.986** 1.188***
 (0.428)   (0.459) (0.846) (0.833) (0.459)
lag of mean exp -0.458*** -0.497*** -0.920*** -0.888*** -0.497***
(0.076) (0.083) (0.157) (0.153) (0.083)
lag of RER vuln -2.842 -2.23 -4.111 -3.863 -2.231
lag of DLD -4.338 4.212 7.987 7.808 4.212
int. RER vuln DLD 76.98*** 63.85*** 118.33*** 113.38*** 63.85***
Ex. Regime 5 0.051 0.111 0.155 0.146 0.111
lag res over CAD 0.019*** 0.127*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.032***
lag M2 over reserves 0.295** 0.229* 0.399* 0.373 0.229*
lag credit growth -3.105* -3.484* -7.421** -7.466** -3.484*
lag FDI/GDP -0.788 -20.184 -36.482 -35.420 -20.184
country dummies yes yes yes no  no
month dummies yes yes yes yes yes
linear time trend yes yes yes*** yes*** yes***
quadratic time tr. yes* yes yes*** yes*** yes***
cubic time tr. no yes yes*** yes*** yes***
Constant -2.45 -24.872*** -46.077*** no  -28.798***
Observations 689 689 689 689 837
Standard errors in Parantheses, *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
pooled probit
Emerging Markets - Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator
Table 8: Alternative Estimation Methods
43A.12 List of Headline Crises
 Focal crises - Headline crises - (large IMF packages, defaults, currency crises) measures
Private Net 
Flows on Debt 5/
Country  year What defined crises
IMF-supported Programs/Aid 
packages
((GDPt - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100




Finance 2/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/
the 70s
Peru 1978
sovereign default, Currency crisis (FR), no banking 
crises
1978: IMF stabilization program+ 
multilateral rescheduling with 
official and private creditors  0.08 5.68 -6.89 -4.75 -5.93 -4.32 -4.77
Turkey 1978
sovereign default, no currency crises, fall in Central 
bank reserves, 1982-85 Systemic banking crisis 2.83 1.93 -5.89 -2.65 -1.61 -2.88 -2.01
United Kingdom 1974-76
Currency Crisis in 1976 (ERW), Borderline and 
smaller banking crisis -1.70 -2.38 5.08 2.24 5.08 2.25
Zaire  1978
Sovereign default since 1976, Enormous amounts of 
external debt lead to Paris Club reschedulings in 1979 
as well as 1981 and with a syndicate of commercial 
banks in 1980, Currency Crisis in 1979 (MR and BP), 
1980s Systemic banking crisis -5.30 -5.02 -0.21 -6.86 -6.69
crises countries 80s 
Argentina 1982-88 1982
sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1981 (MR1, FR, 
GKR) and 82 ( FR, BP, GKR), 1980-82 Systemic 
banking crisis, 1989-90  Systemic banking crisis, 
hyperinflation -3.15 0.47 0.24 0.18 -0.11 0.16 -0.23
Bolivia 1980
sovereign default in 1980,  hyperinflation, Spring 
1984 suspension of interest payments to commercial 
banks, Currency Crises in 1980 (MR2), 1982 (MR, 
FR, BP, GKR), 83 (FR, BP, GKR), 84 (FR) and 85 
(FR, BP, GKR),1986-88 Systemic banking crisis 0.61 1.54 -10.13 -12.29 -2.40 -19.60 -14.72
Brazil 1982
sovereign default 1983, Currency Crisis in 1982 (BP) 
and 83 (FR, BP, GKR), no banking crisis
Brady Plan: Brazil Parallel 
Financing agreement, terms 
announced Sep 1988 -4.36 -8.63 0.24 -0.69 -0.41 -1.12 -0.38
Bulgaria 1990 1989
No sovereign default but during second half of 80s 
build up of large external debt in order to finance 
enlarging current account deficit. no data on currency 
crises available, but exhaustion of foreign reserves. 
1995-97 Systemic banking crisis
Brady Plan: Bulgaria Brady, terms 
announced Mar 1994 -0.50 -9.55 0.68 -0.30 -3.88 0.49 -2.01
Chile (Cline p. 287, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/) 1982
Sovereign default in 1983, Currency Crises in 1982 
(MR, FR, GKR) and 83 (FR), 1981-86 Systemic 
banking crisis -13.42 -16.44 -5.50 -9.57 -10.03 -9.95 -10.49
China 1990
Currency Crises 1990 (MR), 1991 Systemic banking 
crisis 3.80 13.35 1.14 -1.74 -0.21 -2.46 -0.95
Colombia  (Cline p.280) 1983
No Sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1983 (GKR) 
1985 (BP and GKR), 1982-87 Systemic banking crisis 1.57 4.98 -1.88 -3.21 -2.56 -3.72 -3.33
Costa Rica 1981
Sovereign default, Severe balance of payment crisis, 
Currency Crises in 1981 (MR and FR), no banking 
crisis
Brady plan: Costa Rica Brady 
terms announced May 1990 0.80 -6.25 -8.41 -7.07 -10.07 -9.32 -7.19
Cote d'Ivoire 1984
Sovereign default, no Currency Crisis, Systemic 
banking crisis from  1988-91 Brady plan concluded in 1997 -2.00 1.55 0.38 -25.75 -13.32 -20.19 -12.80
Ecuador 1982
Sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1983 (MR2), 84 
(MR1) and 86 ( MR, FR),1980- 83 Systemic banking 
crisis
Brady plan:Ecuador Brady, terms 
announced May 1994 1.20 -1.63 -7.93 0.93 7.40 3.46 2.30
Korea (Sachs, p. 121) 1979-82 1980
No Sovereign default, but in 1981world's fourth 
largest debtor country. Currency Crisis in 1980 (MR, 
BP and GKR), Doubling of inflation from 14.4 % in 
1978 to 28.7 % in 1980. -2.09 4.24 -0.11 0.77 1.99 6.74 1.83
Jordan 1989
Sovereign default on loans to commercial banks, 
Currency Crisis (MR1, FR, BP), Non systemic 
banking crisis
Brady Plan: Jordan Brady, terms 
announced in July 1993 -13.45 -7.29 24.74 -41.37 -3.59 -34.87 -5.61
Output
Net Private Capital 
Flows
Net Private Capital 
Flows plus Net Errors 
and Omissions
44 Focal crises - Headline crises - (large IMF packages, defaults, currency crises) measures
Private Net 
Flows on Debt 5/
Country  year What defined crises
IMF-supported Programs/Aid 
packages
((GDPt - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100




Finance 2/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/
the 90s till present
Argentina 1995
Contagion from Mexican crisis, background currency 
board without deposit incsurance scheme and without 
lender of last resort: withdrawal of bank deposits, 
significant loss of central bank's gross reserves, 
liqidity crunch, surge in interest rates,  output 
contraction, Systemic banking crisis X / EFF 3.85 7.79 5.36 -1.16 -1.88 -1.91 -2.38
Argentina 2001-2
sovereign default, no data on currency crisis, 2001-
present Systemic banking crisis 2.10 5.27 -7.19 -4.28 -5.02 -5.06
Brazil 1998
No sovereign default, Currency crises in 1999 (MR1), 
substantial curret account deficit, surge of interest 
rates, outflow of capital, Output contraction, 1994-9 
Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA/ SRF, new arrangement, 
12/2/98, X / SBA/SRF, new 
arrangement, 9/14/01,   0.13 0.92 0.07 0.41 0.82 0.31 0.85
Ecuador 1999
El Nino crisis, default on external and internal debt, 
Currency Crises in 1999 (MR1), 1998-present 
Systemic banking crisis -6.30 -3.67 -4.26 -16.63 -13.47 -14.09 -15.36
ERM 1992/1993
Currency Crises: Denmark 93 (GKR), Finland 92 
(GKR, ERW), Ireland 92 (ERW), Italy 92 (ERW), 
Portugal 93 (MR1), Spain 92 (GKR) and 93 (GKR), 
Sweden 92 (ERW), UK 92 (ERW) 0.00 0.00
Finland 1991-94
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis in 1991 (GKR) 
and 92 (GKR, ERW), Systemic banking crisis -6.26 -9.37 -3.20 -5.88 -1.55 -4.19
Indonesia  1997-98
no sovereign default, consequence of unresolved 
capital account crisis, important short-term private 
sector external debt, depreciation, hyperinflation, runs 
on deposits, collaps of corporate balance sheets, sharp 
economic contraction, Currency Crisis in 1997 (MR2, 
BP, GKR), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA, new arrangement, 
11/5/97 4.54 -9.18 -2.92 -0.90 -3.71 0.95 -5.46
Korea 1997-8
No sovereign default, but high level of short term 
private foreign debt, Curreny Crisis in 1997 (MR2, 
FR, BP, GKR) and 98 (MR1)
X/ SBA/SRF, new arrangement, 
12/4/97 5.01 -2.01 -6.32 -8.52 -4.54 -9.70 -5.72
Mexico 1994-5
Tequila crisis. No sovereign default, Currency Crisis 
in 1994 (BP, GKR) and 95 (MR), 1994-97 Systemic 
banking crisis
X / SBA, new arrangement, 
2/1/95 -6.17 -1.33 0.10 -4.09 -4.32 -2.67 -2.90
Malaysia 1997-8
No sovereign default, interest rate surge, real GDP 
contraction, Currency Crisis in 1997 (FR, BP), 1998 
(MR1), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis 7.32 -0.57 1.39 -7.82 -7.17 -7.55 -4.83
Norway 1987-93 1989
No sovereign default, currency crisis in 1986 (ERW), 
Systemic banking crisis 0.90 2.92 -2.69 -2.94 -2.85 -3.10
Pakistan 1999-2000
Sovereign default, Eurobond exchange, no Currency 
Crisis in 1999, 2000 n.a., no data on banking crisis  3.96 7.57 -0.72 -1.06 0.97 -0.49 0.57
Phillipines 1997
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis in 1997 (FR, 
GKR), 1998-present Systemic banking crisis X/ EFF 5.19 4.58 2.55 -4.83 -4.82 -7.60 -7.54
Russia 1998
Sovereign default 1998-99, interest rate surge, 
Currency Crises in 1998 (GS), 1998-9 Systemic 
banking crisis
EFF/SFR/CCFF, Augmentation 
and Extension, 7/20/98  -4.90 0.24 2.90 0.26 1.46 -0.51 0.47
Sweden 1991
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis 1992 (GKR), 
Systemic banking crisis -1.11 -2.83 -4.02 -9.30 -4.02 -4.67
Thailand 1997-8
No sovereign default, but roll over of short term debt 
stopped,  Currency Crisis in 1997( MR2, FR, BP, 
GKR), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA, new arrangement, 
8/20/97 -1.37 -11.74 -7.11 -18.42 -12.75 -18.54 -13.05
Turkey 1994
No sovereign default, interest rate surge,  Currency 
Crisis in 1994 (BP, GKR), Non systemic banking 
crisis X/ SBA -4.97 1.57 -9.47 -4.45 -6.19 -4.45 -4.23
Turkey 2000
No sovereign default, no data on currency crisis 
available, 2000-present Systemic banking crisis
X / SBA/SRF, augmentation, 
5/15/01,  SBA, new arrangement, 
2/4/02 7.36 -0.69 1.18 -1.33 3.75 -1.33 1.53
Output
Net Private Capital 
Flows
Net Private Capital 
Flows plus Net Errors 
and Omissions
Table 9: Headline Crises from the 1970-2000
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